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THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE AND STATE-
PROVIDED SPECIAL EDUCATION AND
THERAPY
I. INTRODUCTION
Two years ago, Jane and John Doe had a child' who suffered from oxygen
deprivation during childbirth.2 The lack of oxygen at this critical time caused
the child to suffer severe mental retardation and cerebral palsy Jane and
John have filed a medical malpractice action against the doctor who delivered
their child.4 The Does' complaint alleges that the doctor negligently failed to
diagnose and treat their child's fetal distress. A portion of the damages the
Does seek from the doctor are to cover the expenses associated with
providing their child with the special education and therapy that he will
require throughout his school-age years.
Assuming the Does are successful in their malpractice claim, under the
traditional application of the collateral source rule5 they will be entitled to
recover damages for the cost of special education and therapy-despite the
fact that their state of residence provides, as a matter of right, free special
1. Courts have considered the applicability of the collateral source rule to free, state-provided
special education and therapy in seven cases. See infra notes 74-114. This hypothetical is based on a
compilation of facts from five of the seven cases. The remaining two cases considering the collateral
source rule in this context involved injuries to young children. The age of these plaintiffs and the
enormous cost of providing them with special education until they reach adulthood make the
application of the collateral source rule to free, state-provided special education and therapy a crucial
factor in determining the amount of the plaintiff's recovery for economic damages.
2. Commonly referred to as oxygen deprivation, fetal anoxia or intrauterine asphyxia may result
from a "prolapse of the [umbilical] cord, placenta abruption, [or] compression of the umbilical vein."
AGNES C. FRENAY & ROSE M. MAHONEY, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL TERMINOLOGY, 298 (9th ed.
1993).
3. A full discussion of the link between oxygen deprivation, mental retardation and cerebral
palsy is beyond the scope of this Note. For purposes of this hypothetical, the traditional view that such
a causal link exists is presumed. For an opposing view, see David G. Duff, Compensation for
Neurologically Impaired Infants: Medical No Fault in Virginia, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 391, 395
(1990) (noting that a "reassessment" of the traditional view is necessary in light of recent medical
research).
4. This hypothetical assumes that the state where the Does live has not adopted a no-fault
system of compensation for neurologically impaired infants suffering severe mental injuries during
childbirth. Several states, including Virginia have adopted such a system. For a discussion of the
Virginia approach, see id.
5. The traditional approach has been followed by five of the seven jurisdictions considering the
application of the collateral source rule to free, state-provided special education and therapy. See infra
notes 74-102 and accompanying text.
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education and therapy to all disabled children.6 Moreover, under the
traditional application of the collateral source rule, no evidence relating to the
existence of the free, state-provided services will be admissible at trial if it is
offered to mitigate the damages suffered by the Does.7 Rather, the only
evidence the jury may consider when computing the damages will be the
expenses associated with providing special education and therapy for the
child in a private educational institution for children with disabilities.8
Furthermore, under the collateral source rule, the Does will be entitled to
recover the reasonable cost of providing special education and therapy for
their child even if they intend to avail themselves of the special education and
therapy the state will provide to their child at no cost.9
This Note offers a critical analysis of the collateral source rule as it is
applied to free, state-provided special education and therapy. Part II of this
Note briefly introduces the collateral source rule and its application in a
modem court. Part III provides a brief history of the collateral source rule and
its development since its inception in the mid-nineteenth century. Part IV
examines the various justifications and critiques offered for the collateral
source rule. Part V discusses the few occasions that courts have examined the
application of the collateral source rule to state-provided special education
and therapy. Part VI presents a critical analysis of the application of the
collateral source rule to state-provided special education and therapy. Finally,
Part VII offers a proposal for dealing with the existence of free, state-
provided services in cases where the plaintiff seeks an award of damages for
the cost of special education and therapy.
II. DEFINITION AND OPERATION OF THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
In its most basic form, the "collateral source rule provides in general that
compensation received from a third party will not diminish the recovery
6. The right of a child with disabilities to receive free, state-provided special education and
therapy is mandated by federal statute. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1990), The statute provides that to
receive federal funding, states must assure "all children with disabilities the right to a free appropriate
public education ... available for all children with disabilities between the ages of three and twenty-
one.., regardless of the severity of their disability .. ."I d.
In accord with federal law, most states also have laws guaranteeing children with disabilities free,
state-provided special education and therapy. For an example of one of these statutes, see infra note
86.
7. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
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against a wrongdoer."' Section 920A(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
states the rule in similar terms: "Payments made to or benefits conferred on
the injured party from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's
liability, although they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor
is liable."''
No matter what precise language is used to define the rule, most courts
and commentators characterize the collateral source rule as functioning both
as part of the substantive law of damages and as a "rule" of evidence.'"
Although this characterization has caused some confusion, 3 it is nevertheless
an accurate description of the role the collateral source rule plays in most
jurisdictions which apply the rule. 4
10. Hubbarb Broadcasting, Inc. v. Loescher, 291 N.W.2d 216,222 (Minn. 1980).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1977); See also Kistler v. Halsey, 481 P.2d
722, 724 (Colo. 1971) ("[C]ompensation or indemnity received by an injured party from a collateral
source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer ... will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable
from the wrongdoer.").
12. See, e.g., Richard C. Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages,
46 MINN. L. REV. 669, 675 (1962); Robert A. Sedler, The Collateral Source Rule and Personal Injury
Damages: The Irrelevant Principle and the Functional Approach, 58 KY. L.J. 36, 41 (1969). But see,
Joel K. Jacobsen, The Collateral Source Rule and the Role of the Jury, 70 OR. L. REv. 523, 525-526
(1991). Jacobsen eschews as "hermaphroditic" the traditional notion that the collateral source rule is
both part of the substantive law of damages and a rule of evidence. Id. Instead, Jacobsen argues that
"properly analyzed, the collateral source rule is a substantive rule of damages and not a rule of
evidence." Id.
13. See Jacobsen, supra note 12, at 525 (noting that classification of the collateral source rule as
a rule of evidence would appear to make the collateral source rule "an exception to Federal Rule of
Evidence 101 ...and the Erie doctrine" which mandates "that federal law govern[] evidentiary
questions in federal courts").
14. Although most jurisdictions apply the rule in its traditional form, incorporating both the
substantive and evidentiary components, some jurisdictions have retained the substantive aspect of the
rule-prohibiting the outright deduction of collateral source benefits while abandoning the rule's
evidentiary component. In these jurisdictions, the defendant is entitled to introduce evidence that all or
a portion of the plaintiff's damages were paid by a collateral source. The plaintiff is then entitled to
introduce evidence about the cost to obtain the collateral source benefit (in most situations this
evidence will be of paid insurance premiums). The fact finder is then entitled to consider this evidence
in calculating the plaintiff's damages, but is not required to summarily reduce the plaintiff's award by
the amount of the collateral benefits. This approach to the collateral source rule typically applies when
a plaintiff seeks damages for medical or hospital expenses. See, for example, ALA. CODE § 12-21-45
(1995), which provides:
(a) In all civil actions where damages for any medical or hospital expenses are claimed and are
legally recoverable fbr personal injury or death, evidence that the plaintiff's medical or hospital
expenses have been or will be paid or reimbursed shall be admissible as competent evidence. In
such actions upon admission of evidence respecting reimbursement or payment of medical or
hospital expenses, the plaintiff shall be entitled to introduce evidence of the cost of obtaining
reimbursement or payment of medical or hospital expenses.
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As part of the substantive law of damages, the collateral source rule
dictates that compensation received from a source wholly independent from
the tortfeasor"5 will not be deducted from the plaintiffs recovery from the
tortfeasor. 6 In furtherance of this objective, the collateral source rule also
incorporates an evidentiary component, which precludes the introduction of
evidence relating to any benefits the plaintiff may have received from a
collateral source, when offered by the tortfeasor to mitigate 7 the amount of
damages suffered.'"
15. The collateral source rule only applies if the source of the benefit is wholly independent of
the tortfeasor. The rule has no application if the tortfeasor or a person acting on behalf of the tortfeasor
makes payments to the plaintiff to compensate him for the injuries he sustained. In this situation, the
tortfeasor is entitled to apro tanto reduction of the plaintiff's damage award. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §920A(1) (1977) ("A payment made by a tortfeasor or by a person acting for him
to a person whom he has injured is credited against his tort liability, as are payments made by another
who is, or believes he is, subject to the same tort liability.").
16. For example, in a case where the plaintiff recovers $100 from the tortfeasor for injuries
sustained as a result of the tortfeasor's negligence, the tortfeasor is not entitled to have the judgment
reduced to $75 where the plaintiff's medical insurer paid medical bills of $25. Rather, under the
traditional application of the collateral source rule, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the full $100 from
the tortfeasor.
17. The evidentiary component of the collateral source rule only precludes a plaintiff from
offering evidence of collateral source benefits to mitigate the amount of damages the plaintiff suffered.
The collateral source rule does not preclude the defendant from offering evidence that the plaintiff
received collateral source benefits when this evidence is offered for purposes other than to mitigate the
amount of damages the plaintiff suffered. For example, in Moore v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 825
S.W.2d 839, 842-843 (Mo. 1992), the court allowed the defendant to introduce evidence of collateral
benefits received to rebut the plaintiff's contention that the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff to
suffer financial distress which precluded him from continuing medical treatment. The court held "the
raising of plaintiff's financial condition ... permits the opposing party to attack [the plaintiff's] claims
of financial distress by showing that other financial assistance was available." Id. at 843. Similarly,
where the plaintiff is seeking damages for lost wages and there is evidence that the plaintiff has been
malingering in (i.e., not returning to work because of payments from collateral sources such as
unemployment compensation and social security benefits), evidence of the collateral payments is
admissible. See, e.g., Corsetti v. Stone Co., 483 N.E.2d 793, 802 (Mass. 1985).
18. Although this evidentiary component may appear similar to the substantive law of damages
component discussed above, a closer examination reveals a significant difference. While the
substantive component of the collateral source rule precludes an outright deduction of the amounts
received from the collateral source, the evidentiary component of the collateral source rule precludes
the defendant from offering evidence that the plaintiff has received a benefit from a collateral source-
evidence that could mitigate the amount of damages that the plaintiff has suffered. Thus, the collateral
source rule effectively precludes a defendant from offering evidence that the plaintiff never really
suffered the damages claimed because those damages were reimbursed by a collateral source. At least
one commentator has focused on this component of the collateral source rule as an invasion of the
province of the jury and its fact finding role. See Jacobsen, supra note 12 at 541.
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III. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
Most commentators agree that the collateral source rule 9 traces its roots to
an 1854 Supreme Court case, The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison. ° The
date of this decision is important for two reasons. First, the date provides the
collateral source rule with almost one hundred and fifty years of precedental
value- a factor that has made abolition or even modification of the rule a
difficult process.2' Second, the date of the decision provides the context for
understanding a rule which, at first glance, appears to be far removed from
modem notions of the proper functioning of the tort system.2"
19. The term "collateral" was first used to describe the benefit conferred upon the plaintiff by a
third party in Harding v. Town of Townsend, 43 Vt. 536, 538 (1871) (holding proceeds of plaintiff's
liability insurance should not reduce the amount of damages the plaintiff was entitled to recover from
the defendant). See Albert Averbach, The Collateral Source Rule, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 231, 233 (1960).
20. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 153 (1854). The Propeller Monticello arose from a collision on Lake
Huron between the propeller and a schooner-both carrying cargo. The schooner, which sank, was
insured. The insurer accepted the abandonment of the schooner and paid its owners for the loss. Id. at
153-156. In a subsequent tort action brought by the schooner's owner, the steamship owner argued that
an insurance pay-off released it from liability. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed:
The contract with the insurer is in the nature of a wager between third parties, with which the
trespasser has no concern. The insurer does not stand in the relation of a joint trespasser, so that
satisfaction accepted from him shall be a release of others.
Id. at 157-60; see, e.g., Deana A. Goldsmith, A Survey of the Collateral Source Rule: The Effects of
Tort Reform and Impact on Multistate Litigation, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 799 (1988); Maxwell, supra
note 12, at 671 n.6. But see, Jacobsen, supra note 12, at 527. Jacobsen argues that scholars tracing the
collateral source rule to The Propeller Monticello are incorrect. Id. Rather, Jacobsen maintains that The
Propeller Monticello simply abolished the common-law rule that releasing one tortfeasor from liability
was a bar against seeking recovery from a joint-tortfeasor. Id. Jacobsen points out that the defendant in
The Propeller Monticello "did not raise the issue of insurance proceeds as mitigation, but rather as a
total defense." Id.; cf O'Connor, "Collateral Source" Rule and Full Special Damages, 1957 TRIAL &
TORT TRENDS, 642, 645 (suggesting that Althorfv. Wolfe, 22 N.Y. 355 (1860), was the first American
case to apply the collateral source rule).
21. Even though the collateral source rule has been the subject of abundant criticism from
academics and students alike, see, e.g., Charles W. Peckinpaugh, Jr., An Analysis of the Collateral
Source Rule, 1966 INS. L.J. 545; Note, Unreason and the Law of Damages, 77 HARV. L. REV. 741
(1964) (frequently cited student piece critical of the collateral source rule), its proponents are no less
passionate in their defense of the rule; see Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., The Case for the Collateral Source
Rule, 1966 INS. L.J. 531 (arguing that the collateral source rule "must be protected not only against
frontal assault but against the erosions of side-door evasions and back-door intrusions"); see also
Maxwell, supra note 12, at 695 ("At its best, in some cases, [the collateral source rule] operates as an
instrument of what most of us would be willing to call justice.".) There is no doubt that intense passion
on both sides has forced even legislatures hostile to the collateral source rule to modify or abrogate the
rule only in specific types of actions or for specific types of damages. For a discussion of the various
approaches taken by state legislatures in statutes abolishing or modifying the collateral source rule, see
Michael Flynn, Private Medical Insurance and the Collateral Source Rule: A Good Bet?, 22 U. TOL.
L. REv. 39,49-64 (1990).
22. Traditionally the tort system was thought of as having two primary goals: 1) just and fair
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The collateral source rule developed at a time when the various collateral
sources available to assist today's plaintiff were almost completely
unknown.' "People paid their medical bills out of private funds or savings, or
a member of the family paid for them.... Those who were unable to pay
were treated in the 'poor ward' of a hospital or at a 'charity' hospital ....24
Moreover, the existing theories of recovery upon which an injured plaintiff
could base her claim for damages made it clear that the tortfeasor was thought
of as a "wrongdoer" deserving to pay for the harm that she caused.25
From a plaintiff's perspective, the attractiveness of such a rule was readily
apparent. The collateral source rule has been articulated as follows:
Where a part of the wrongdoer's liability is discharged by payment
from a collateral source ...the question arises who shall benefit
therefrom, the wrongdoer or the injured person. No reason in law,
equity or good conscience can be advanced why a wrongdoer should
benefit from part payment from a collateral source of damages caused
by his wrongful act.
26
compensation of the injured party and 2) deterrence of wrongful or negligent conduct. The continued
validity of these goals has been the subject of debate in light of the rise in the availability of liability
insurance and social welfare programs. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
23. See James D. Ghiardi, The Collateral Source Rule: Multiple Recovery in Personal Injury
Actions, 1967 INS. LJ. 457, 458. An example of a typical collateral source problem faced by
nineteenth century courts was as follows:
The plaintiff; an elderly woman of modest means, was injured by the clear negligence of
defendant's servant. It is probable that the defendant did not carry liability insurance ... The
plaintiff needed medical and nursing care as a result of her injuries, so her two sons came from out
of state to care for her. Their services were performed gratuitously. At the trial, the tortfeasor asked
the court to not allow the jury to award the plaintiff the "reasonable compensation for nurse hire
and attendance" since she had received these services for free from her sons.
Banks McDowell, The Collateral Source Rule-The American Medical Association and Tort Reform,
24 WASHBURN L.J. 205, 207 (1985) (footnote omitted). The trial court was then faced with the choice
of denying the plaintiff a significant portion of her damages or making the tortfeasor answer for the
injuries his servant caused. Given this choice, the decision was relatively easy. Id. at 207-08.
24. Sedler, supra note 12, at39.
25. Id. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, a tortfeasor would only be liable if found
negligent "under the rather strict concepts of negligence that existed ... and if the plaintiff was not
barred by contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, the fellow-servant rule, or one of the other
liability-limiting devices developed ... to protect the new industrial enterprises." Id. Moreover, the
general unavailability of liability insurance meant the deterrent goal of the tort system would be
furthered as the defendant who was forced to pay the full amount of the plaintiff's damages, even
though a portion of those damages were offset by a collateral source, quickly realized the negative
consequences of her actions. Id.
26. Grayon v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958) (holding that the plaintiff could recover
the reasonable value of medical and hospital expenses plus charges of special nurses, even though the
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There can be no doubt that this articulation, as well as the ability to
provide compensation to injured plaintiffs, led to a rapidly expanding
application of the collateral source rule.27 Courts applied the collateral source
rule to the following: payments to the plaintiff by insurers,28 benefits provided
by employers,29 gratuitous services,30 damages due regardless of a widow's
remarriage to a wealthier husband,3 savings from the tax- free status of
compensatory damages,32 and various services provided by governmental
special nurses were paid for by a hospital association to which plaintiff contributed).
27. While the application of the collateral source rule most commonly arises in the context of a
plaintiff who has brought a tort action against the defendant, the rule has also been employed in breach
of contract cases, see John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Contract Damages, 71 CAL. L.
REv. 56 (1983) (arguing that the difference in policies underlying contract and tort does not by itself
justify the reluctance to use the collateral source rule in contract cases), civil rights actions brought
under section 1983, see Linda L. House, Section 1983 and the Collateral Source Rule, 40 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 101 (1992) (discussing the different treatments the collateral source rule receives in various state
and federal courts considering the application of the rule in civil rights actions), and employment
discrimination actions brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see Thomas W. Lee,
Deducting Unemployment Compensation and Ending Employment Discrimination: Continuing
Conflict, 43 EMORY L.J. 325 (1994) (examining whether unemployment compensation is truly
collateral to the defendant employer in an employment discrimination case where the employer has
made payments to the unemployment compensation fund).
28. Although the collateral source rule expanded into other areas, payments by the plaintiff's
insurer to the plaintiff that cover a portion of her damages, most commonly medical expenses, still
represent the most common situation in which the application of the collateral source rule arises. This
fact has made abolishing or modifying the collateral source rule an important goal of those seeking to
reform the U.S. health care system. See infra note 49.
29. The issue of collateral source benefits arises in the context of employment benefits when an
employer continues to make payments to an employee who has been injured by the conduct of a third
party and is unable to work. Typical of these types of employer provided collateral benefits are paid
vacation and paid sick-days. Many cases address the collateral source rule in these contexts. See, e.g.,
Lewis v. County of Contra Costa, 278 P.2d 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (sick leave); Hawthorne v.
Southeastern Fid. Ins. Co., 387 So. 2d 26 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (vacation time); McCary v. Caperton,
601 So. 2d 866 (Miss. 1992) (sick leave); Amiker v. Brakefield, 473 So. 2d 939 (Miss. 1985); Ellard v.
Harvey 231 S.E.2d 339 (W. Va. 1976) (sick leave); Fisher v. Thompson, 275 S.E.2d 507 (N.C. CL
App. 1981) (sick leave).
30. When the collateral source rule is applied to gratuitous services, the plaintiff is usually
permitted to recover the reasonable value of the services rendered even though she incurred no cost.
See Cates v. Wilson, 361 S.E.2d 734, 739 (N.C. 1987) (plaintiff entitled to recover value of medical
services provided for free by family member); Scott v. Southern Ry. Co., 97 S.E.2d 73, 76 (S.C. 1957)
(automobile furnished to plaintiff for free while his vehicle was repaired); Degen v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 241 N.W.2d 703, 708 (S.D. 1976) (plaintiff entitled to recover for medical bills even though his
parents paid the bills).
31. As divorced from modern concepts as this may appear, defendants in earlier times attempted
to argue that a widow's remarriage to a wealthier husband reduced the amount of damages she was
entitled to recover for the death of her husband. This argument was universally rejected by the courts.
See, e.g., Bunda v. Hardwick, 138 N.W.2d 305, 308 (Mich. 1965); Moore v. Ready Mixed Concrete
Co., 329 S.W.2d 14, 21 (Mo. 1959).
32. One commentator has called this a "very important" but "indirect" application of the
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agencies.33
While the early and middle part of this century saw the judicial application
of the collateral source rule expand,34 beginning in the 1970s the collateral
source rule became the prime target of state legislatures looking for a way to
check the rising costs of medical malpractice insurance. 5 Numerous states
enacted statutes eliminating or qualifying the collateral source rule.3
6
Although these legislative attempts to encroach upon the collateral source rule
have not met with complete success,37 the abolition or modification of the
collateral source rule. See Lee R. West, The Collateral Source Rule Sans Subrogation: A Plaintfifs
Windfall, 16 OKLA. L. REV. 395, 405 (1963). In this situation the collateral source rule operates in the
following manner Under section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, damages for personal
injuries, even damages for lost wages are tax free. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994). Thus, defendants
sought to have a plaintiff's award of damages for lost wages reduced to reflect what the plaintiffwould
have received had the money been earned and hence subject to income tax. The majority of courts
addressing this issue have held that the plaintiffs award should not be reduced. See, e.g., Mitchell v.
Emblade, 298 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Ariz. 1956); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 N.E.2d 77, 85 (III.
1955).
33. The collateral source rule has been applied to benefits received by plaintiffs from various
governmental agencies and social programs including: Social Security, see, e.g., Allen v. Louisiana,
535 So. 2d 903, 913 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Pacesetter Corp. v. Barrickmen, 885 S.W.2d 256, 260 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1994); Medicaid and Medicare, see, e.g., Williamson v. St. Francis Medical Center, Inc., 559
So. 2d 929, 934 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Badgett v. Davis, 411 S.E.2d 200,202 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991); and
veteran's benefits, see, e.g., Hudson v. Lazurus, 217 F.2d 344, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (collateral source
rule applied to plaintiff's treatment at a Veteran's hospital). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 920A cmt. (4)(c) (1977) ("Social legislation benefits, welfare payments, pensions under
special retirement acts, all are subject to the collateral-source rule.").
34. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
35. For a discussion of the reform-minded state legislatures' goals and the various steps
undertaken to achieve those goals, see Eleanor D. Kinney, Malpractice Reforms in the 1990's: Past
Disappointments, Future Successes?, 20 . HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 99 (1995).
36. See Flynn, supra note 21, at 49-64. Flynn classifies legislative actions attempting to reform
the operation of the collateral source rule into four categories: 1) statutes which provide that the
plaintiff's recovery from the defendant must be reduced by the amount of the collateral source
benefits; 2) statutes that permit the admission of facts that the plaintiff has received collateral source
benefits to mitigate the amount of damages the plaintiff has suffered into evidence; 3) statutes which
narrow the description of recoverable damages to those damages not payable by a collateral source;
and 4) the use of automobile no-fault insurance systems which specifically provide for the "admission
and use of collateral source benefits to reduce any tort recovery by an injured party." Id. at 64.
37. A number of the state statutes modifying or abrogating the collateral source rule have
encountered serious constitutional obstacles. See generally, Faye L. Ferguson, Note, Equal Protection
Challenges to Legislative Abrogation of the Collateral Source Rule, 44 NVASH. & LEE L. REv. 1303
(1987). The bulk of these challenges were based on the argument that abolishing or modifying the
operation of the collateral source rule for only a particular class of plaintiffs or defendants violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Id. at 1306-07. Ferguson noted that the
constitutionality of the statutes depended on the level of scrutiny the particular court chose to use. Id.
at 1330; see also Christopher J. Eaton, Comment, The Kansas Legislature's Attempt to Abrogate the
Collateral Source Rule: Three Strikes and They're Out?, 42 KAN. L. REV. 913 (1994) (discussing
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collateral source rule remains a central focus of those seeking to reform not
only the tort system,38 but also the health insurance system in the United
States.39
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS AND CRITICISMS OF THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
Courts and commentators have generally advanced four justifications or
rationales for the collateral source rule.40 Each of these justifications has been
the subject of vigorous attacks by opponents of the rule.4'
A. Benefit of the Bargain Rationale
One of the most common arguments in support of the collateral source
rule is that the plaintiff should not be denied the benefit of contractual
arrangements he has made with third parties for compensation in the event of
a loss.42 This rationale for the rule frequently arises where the plaintiff has
purchased some form of an insurance policy.43 Proponents of the collateral
three separate occasions when the Kansas Supreme Court declared the Kansas statute
unconstitutional); Julie A. Schafer, Note, The Constitutionality of Offsetting Collateral Benefits Under
Ohio Revised Code Section 2317.45, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 587 (1992); Calvin R. Wright, Note, The
Collateral Source Rule in Georgia: A New Method of Equal Protection Analysis Brings a Return to the
Old Common Law Rule, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 835 (1992).
38. See Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape, 81 A.B.A. J. 56 (1995) (discussing proposed
federal reforms of the tort system and noting that since 1986 eight states have focused on the abolition
or modification of the collateral source rule as a key reform).
39. Abolition of the collateral source rule is seen by many as a key ingredient in containing
health care costs in the United States. Many reformers believe the collateral source rule causes an
upward pressure on medical malpractice premiums which in turn causes an increase in health care
costs. For a discussion of the various legal reforms linked to health care reforms, see Christopher S.
Kozak, A Review of Federal Medical Malpractice Tort Reform Alternatives, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
599 (1995). The Health Security Act, proposed by the Clinton presidency in 1993, contained
provisions to reform medical malpractice- including the abolition of the collateral source rule. See S.
1757, 103rd Cong. (1993).
40. See infra notes 42-73 and accompanying text
41. See infra notes 42-73 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Rexroad v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 388 P.2d 832, 842 (Kan. 1964) ("The
reasons generally given for the rule are that the contract of insurance and the subsequent conduct of the
insurer and insured in relation thereto are matters with which the wrongdoer has no concern and which
do not affect the measure of his liability.") (citation omitted).
43. The desire to protect the benefit of the plaintiffs bargain with an insurance company has led
one commentator to classify this rationale as the "foresight theory." See West, supra note 32, at 413.
Under this theory, the plaintiff should not be punished for his "foresight" in obtaining insurance to
protect himself by the reduction of his award from the tortfeasor to account for the proceeds of the
insurance policy. Id. Closely related to the "foresight theory" is the notion that the collateral source
rule encourages the socially useful practice of individuals maintaining private insurance policies. See,
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source rule argue that allowing the defendant to offset the amount that the
plaintiff has received from these sources would "deny" the plaintiff the
benefit of the bargain for which he contracted."
Critics of the collateral source rule have attempted to undermine the
benefit of the bargain rationale by pointing out its inherent weaknesses. One
commentator has noted that in purchasing insurance purchasers contract for
the security that insurance provides in the event that their injuries are
otherwise uncompensable" Purchasers are not wagering on the possibility
that they might realize a double recovery through the application of the
collateral source rule.46 Moreover, while some commentators recognize the
legitimate end of protecting the plaintiffs investment in insurance, they point
out that providing the plaintiffs insurer with a right of subrogation47 would
both protect this investment in insurance and avoid the-taboo of a "double-
recovery" for the plaintiff.48 Others advocate abrogating the collateral source
e.g., Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 66 (Cal. 1970) (en bane) ("The
collateral source rule expresses a policy judgment in favor of encouraging citizens to purchase and
maintain insurance for personal injuries and for other eventualities.").
44. See Jacobsen, supra note 12, at 523. While voicing his own criticisms of the collateral source
rule, Jacobsen acknowledges that critics who base their attacks solely upon the grounds that the
plaintiff's recovery is more than his out-of-pocket expenses overlook the "[collateral source] rule's
legitimate function of protecting the plaintiff's investment in insurance." Id. The same logic that is
used in the benefit of the bargain rationale is similar to the reasoning that allows for the application of
the collateral source rule to benefits rendered to the plaintiff gratuitously with a slightly different twist.
In cases of services or benefits rendered gratuitously, the justification for applying the collateral source
rule is that to do otherwise would not only deprive the plaintiff of an intended gift, but also frustrate
the intent of the donee who intended to confer the gift on the plaintiff and not upon the tortfeasor. See
Lambert, supra note 21, at 543.
45. See Note, supra note 21, at 751. The author asserts that in purchasing insurance, the plaintiff
purchased the security of "prompt and sure payments without the necessity of litigation and without
regard to the liability and financial resources of prospective defendants." Id. Therefore, the author
reasons that the application of the collateral source rule to insurance proceeds in cases where the
defendant is capable of paying the judgment provides the plaintiff with more than he bargained for in
purchasing insurance. Id.
46. Id.
47. Black's Law Dictionary defines subrogation as "(t]he substitution of one person in the place
of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right .... BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1427
(6th ed. 1990).
48. In the context of the collateral source rule, subrogation would work as follows: A injures B.
B's insurer, C, pays B for the losses he sustains. Subrogation would give C the legal right to recover
the costs of B's injuries from A. This would prevent B from obtaining a windfall, while at the same
time providing B and all insureds with reduced premiums because a portion of an insurance company's
payouts would be recoverable. Moreover, in paying C, A would still be responsible for the full amount
of the damages he caused B to suffer. For an article proposing the use of subrogation to alleviate the
problems associated with the collateral source rule, see vest, supra note 32, at 398. West's proposal is
not limited to cases involving insurance. Rather, West argues that even providers of gratuitous benefits
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rule, but in a manner which allows the plaintiff to recover from the tortfeasor
the cost of obtaining the collateral benefit.49 Still others assert that the benefit
of the bargain rationale is inappropriate for some collateral sources- most
notably government assistance and social programs."
B. Legal Compensation Does Not Adequately Compensate the Plaintiff
Another argument commonly advanced in support of the collateral source
rule is that legal compensation does not adequately compensate the plaintiff.
This rationale was most clearly stated in Hudson v. Lazarus:5
Legal "compensation" for personal injuries does not actually
compensate. Not many people would sell an arm for the average or
even the maximum amount that juries award for loss of an arm.
to the plaintiff receive a right of subrogation. Id. at 419. See also Ghiardi, supra note 23, at 463 ("If
subrogation is employed, a plaintiff receives compensation once and not twice. And only one insurer
pays the loss rather than two, as is the case when the collateral source rule is employed.").
However, the use of subrogation to alleviate some of the perceived problems with the collateral
source rule has met with some sharp criticism. See McDowell, supra note 23, at 217-19. The notion
that subrogation benefits everyone because it lowers insurance rates has also been the subject of
debate. See Flynn, supra note 21, at 50 (arguing that empirical evidence suggests that in states were
subrogation has been utilized, there has not been a decrease in insurance premiums).
49. This approach to modifying the collateral source rule has been embraced by many state
legislatures searching for a way to reform the collateral source rule. Statutes generally abrogating the
rule, but allowing the plaintiff to recover the cost of obtaining the collateral benefit, most typically
insurance premiums, have been enacted in several states. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76(1)
(1996). The statute provides:
In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of
fact and in which damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses sustained, the court
shall reduce the amount of such award by the total of all amounts which have been paid for the
benefit of the claimant, or which are otherwise available to him, from all collateral sources ....
Such reduction shall be offset to the extent of any amount which has been paid, contributed, or
forfeited by, or on behalf of, the claimant or members of his immediate family to secure his right to
any collateral source benefit which he is receiving as a result of his injury.
Id.
50. See Fleming, supra note 27, at 58 ("[b]enefits from a public source cannot be attributed either
to the plaintiff's thrift or prescience..."); James A. Lorentzen & Ronald M. Rankin, The Collateral
Source Issue: Forging a Middle Ground, 35 FED'N OF INS. COUNS. Q. 3, 21-22 (1984) ("A plaintiff
receiving medicare or some other form of government assistance has not paid for the coverage as in the
case of accident and health insurance."). Taking a slightly different perspective on the application of
the collateral source rule, Richard Maxwell rejects the argument that the collateral source rule should
not apply to benefits from social programs because the tortfeasor has contributed to those programs
with his taxes making them not "wholly independent" sources. See Maxwell, supra note 12, at 689. He
concluded that "[o]nly in the most indirect sense can the benefits be said to have been provided by the
wrongdoer." Id.
51. 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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Moreover the injured person seldom gets the compensation he
"recovers", [sic] for a substantial attorney's fee usually comes out of it.
There is a limit to what a negligent wrongdoer can fairly, i.e.,
consistently with the balance of individual and social interests, be
required to pay. But it is not necessarily reduced by the injured
person's getting money or care from a collateral source.52
Moreover, some proponents of the collateral source rule contend that in its
attempt to assist plaintiffs obtain complete recovery, the rule actually
encourages plaintiffs to forgo litigation and settle for less.53
The notion that applying the collateral source rule is justified because it
helps the plaintiff obtain a full and complete recovery has been the subject of
intense criticism.54 Charles Peckinpaugh claims that this argument "is actually
a criticism of our system of litigation, and more particularly [relies on the
assumption] that a jury is incapable of performing its proper function of
awarding full compensation to an injured plaintiff."55 In a similar manner,
opponents of the rule assert that this argument is really nothing more than an
52. Id.; see also Lambert, supra note 21, at 542. In his argument in support of the collateral
source rule, Lambert notes: "Litigation at its best is inconvenient and at its worst, an ordeal, facts
which should be considered when pondering the rejection of the collateral source rule. The
conventional rules of damages allow no compensation for such inconvenience." Id. For Lambert and
other proponents of the collateral source rule, one of the ways to compensate the plaintiff for this
inconvenience is to follow the traditional application of the collateral source rule.
53. See Lorentzen & Rankin, supra note 50, at 11. The authors argue that "[the plaintiff is more
likely to settle [for a smaller sum with the application of the collateral source rule because she knows]
that [s]he has collateral sources from which to gain a full and complete recovery." Id. The authors
conclude, however, that this argument, despite an element of truth, "hardly seems the proper
foundation for the wide-ranging and pervasive way in which the collateral source rule has been
applied." Id.
54. See, e.g., McDowell, supra note 23, at 213. In criticizing the collateral source rule,
McDowell labeled the under compensation/under payment of legal fees rationale as the only possible
justification that can be advanced in light of the dramatic changes that the tort system has seen since
the rule was originally developed. Id. McDowell then concludes that the application of the collateral
source rule actually does not improve the position of the plaintiff, but instead forces her to pay more in
legal fees. L at 213-15.
55. See Peckinpaugh, supra note 21, at 552. Peckinpaugh also contends that even as a device to
account for the alleged undercompensation of plaintiffs the collateral source rule is a failure as the
amount received from the collateral source rule is "fortuitous" and bears no relation to the actual
amount a particular plaintiff is undercompensated. Id. Moreover, Peckinpaugh is quick to point out
that the collateral source rule provides no assistance to a plaintiff who is undercompensated by our
present system yet has no collateral source from which to recoup this loss. Id.; see also Ghiardi, supra
note 23, at 461. In rejecting the collateral source rule, Ghiardi argues in similar terms that "[i]f we
accept the premise that plaintiffs never are fully compensated, we should change the system to assure
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unprincipled critique of the "American rule"56 and hence an inappropriate
justification for the collateral source rule.57 Other critics attack this
justification of the collateral source rule by arguing that juries recognize that
the plaintiff must pay her legal fees and adjust the amount of the verdict
accordingly.5 8
C. The Wrongdoer Deserves to Pay/Any Windfall Should Go to the
Plaintiff
A third common argument in support of the collateral source rule is the
contention that as the wrongdoer, the defendant deserves to pay.59 Proponents
of the collateral source rule taking this position contend that forcing
defendants to bear the full cost of the damages they cause, furthers the tort
system's goal of deterrence.' Recognizing that application of the collateral
source rule will often provide the plaintiff with what critics call a windfall
(i.e., recovery for damages already reimbursed or provided for by a collateral
source), some supporters of the rule maintain that if there is any "windfall," it
is better that it be bestowed upon the "innocent" plaintiff rather than the
"guilty" defendant.'
56. Under the so-called "American rule" each party to the litigation is responsible for its own
legal fees. In contrast, under the "English rule" the losing party in the litigation is charged with the
responsibility of paying not only its own legal fees and costs, but also the legal fees and costs of the
prevailing party. The abolition of the "American rule" in favor of the "English rule" has been the
subject of intense debate among those seeking to reform the U.S. tort system. For a discussion of this
issue, see Herbert M. Kritzer, The English Rule, 78 A.B.A. J. 54 (1992).
57. See. e.g., Jacobsen, supra note 12, at 534. These critics point out that this argument in favor
of the collateral source rule is really an attack on the "American rule" and argue that if the abolition of
the "American rule" is necessary to reform the tort system, it should be openly abolished rather than
"by subterfuge under the cover of collateral source rule." Id.
58. See, Note, supra note 21, at 750. The author argues that juries recognize that plaintiffs must
pay legal fees and use awards of damages for pain and suffering to compensate plaintiffs for these
added fees and costs. Id.
59. John G. Flemming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAL. L.
REV. 1478, 1483 (1966) (noting the common argument in favor of the collateral source rule is that "the
defendant is a wrongdoer who should not be Alet off' from any portion of what is hisdue . .
(emphasis added).
60. See Lambert, supra note 21, at 544. A staunch supporter of the collateral source rule,
Lambert argues that "[i]f civil liability is a deterrent to accidents, then undiminished and unabated
damages for wrongdoing should exert an even more admonitory pressure towards accident
prevention." Id.
61. See supra note 51 and accompanying text; see also Flynn, supra note 21, at 67. In arguing for
the continued application of the collateral source rule to medical insurance payments, Flynn claims that
"[a]bsent the Collateral Source Rule the insured who receives medical benefits, the Awinnings' from
payment of insurance premiums, loses his legal right to full compensation from a guilty tortfeasor." Id.
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Critics of the collateral source rule attack this justification of the rule as
being far detached from modem concepts of the proper functioning of the tort
system.62 They contend that the tort system has evolved in such a way to
prevent defendants, even defendants who have been found civilly liable, from
being considered "guilty" or "wrongdoers."'6 Many commentators also
contend that the increasing use and availability of liability insurance, coupled
with the rise of the modem welfare state, has shifted the primary focus of the
tort system away from deterrence and towards compensation.' These
commentators argue that a key component of a system that strives for fair and
just compensation is the mitigation of damages," which the collateral source
rule fundamentally undermines by allowing the plaintiff to recover for
damages he really never suffered.'
D. Evidence of Collateral Source Benefits Will Prejudice and Confuse the
Jury
The collateral source rule generally precludes the introduction of evidence
relating to payments or services provided to the plaintiff by collateral
(emphasis added).
62. See West, supra note 32, at 412. West claims that the punitive aspect of the collateral source
rule is a "historical hangover from the days when torts and crimes were administered by the same court
and in the same action." id.
63. See Lorentzen & Rankin, supra note 50, at 6 (arguing that "in today's complex litigation-
where manufacturers can be found liable without proof of fault and where culpable plaintiffs can
collect under comparative negligence ... the concept that defendants deserve to pay because they arc
at fault in causing injury is fallacious in many cases").
64. See, Flemming, supra note 59, at 1547-48; see also Sedler, supra note 12, at 46. Sedler
argues that wrongdoers today do not act morally wrong, but rather the basis of modem liability "is
really that it is an efficient loss distributor." Id. Proponents of this view note that by focusing on "loss
distribution" the modem tort system recognizes the impact liability insurance has had in diminishing
the ability to deter conduct with monetary damages. These authors point out that individual tortfeasors
shift the major burden of the loss to their liability insurance carriers. While the tortfeasor may realize a
slight increase in insurance premiums, the "real cost will be spread out to all insureds of the
defendant's class." See Flynn, supra note 21, at 48-49; see also McDowell, supra note 23, at 210.
65. The principle of mitigation is clearly embodied in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§920 (1977) which states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property and in so
doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the
benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.
66. The prospect of a "windfall" or "double-recovery" for the plaintiff led one critic to argue that
the collateral source rule should be named the "double-recovery rule." See Ghiardi, supra note 23, at
457 (arguing that "the collateral source rule exists as an anomaly in the law of personal injury
reparations which should be excised").
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sources.67 This prohibition on the introduction of collateral source evidence is
thought to protect the plaintiff in two ways. Most importantly, the prohibition
aims to prevent the jury from using the collateral source evidence to reduce
the amount of the plaintiff's award.68 Additionally, particularly in regard to
future and continuing collateral source benefits, the prohibition on the
introduction of evidence relating to collateral source payments is designed to
prevent jury confusion. 9
Joel Jacobsen, one of the staunchest critics of evidence exclusion relating
to collateral source benefits, maintains that the collateral source rule has a
"tendency to diminish the jury's fact-finding role by concealing facts relevant
to the calculation of damages."7° Other commentators have interpreted the
evidentiary exclusion as evincing a lack of public support for the collateral
source rule.71 Moreover, critics of the collateral source point out that the
introduction of future or contingent collateral source benefits is simply the
product of a system in which all damages must be sought in one action.7"
They further contend that such evidence is no more confusing to a jury than
other types of complicated evidence which the jury is already forced to
consider.73
67. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
68. See Peckinpaugh, supra note 21, at 551. This argument is presumably based on the
assumption that the jury would consider the evidence of the collateral source payments as an indication
that the plaintiff did not suffer the full amount of the damages claimed. The jury would likely use this
information to reduce the amount of the plaintiff's recovery in violation of the collateral source rule.
Id.
69. Id. at 554 (discussing the argument that the jury will be confused by the introduction of
evidence of collateral source benefits and the tax free status of compensatory damages); see also supra
note 32. The notion that the jury may become confused if exposed to evidence of collateral sources is
applicable to any item of damages involving uncertainty to future collateral benefits. Several courts
addressing the issue of the applicability of the collateral source rule to free, state- provided special
education and therapy have focused on this argument in their decisions to apply the rule. See infra note
95 and accompanying text.
70. See Jacobsen, supra note 12, at 523.
71. See Lorentzen & Rankin, supra note 50, at 7. In analyzing this aspect of the collateral source
rule, the author states that "[t]he public at large must feel or believe that the collateral source rule is
unjustified; otherwise there would be no concern about keeping collateral source information away
from the jury." Id.; see also Peckinpaugh, supra note 21, at 551.
72. See Sedler, supra note 12, at 43 ("The plaintiff must recover all damages, past and
prospective, in a single action, and we are making no more than a guess-only to some extent, an
educated guess-as to what they are.").
73. Critics point out that juries are already required to decide the outcome of very complex issues
whose resolution often depends on evidence with which the jury is wholly unfamiliar. See,
Peckinpaugh, supra note 21, at 554. These types of situations often arise in complex cases such as
medical malpractice or toxic tort actions. Id. Moreover, the estimation of future losses is simply a
product of our jury system which requires that all damages be reduced to their present value. Id.
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V. COURTS CONSIDERING THE APPLICATION OF THE COLLATERAL
SOURCE RULE TO STATE- PROVIDED SPECIAL EDUCATION AND THERAPY
A. MajorityApproach
In Healy v. White, the Supreme Court of Connecticut was the first to
address the application of the collateral source rule to state-provided special
education and therapy.7' In Healy, the plaintiffs sought recovery for injuries
their son sustained as a result of the defendant's negligence.75 At trial, the
plaintiffs introduced evidence that the child would require special education
at a private school that would cost between $8,000 and $16,000 annually.76
On appeal following a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendant argued
that the plaintiffs' might not incur the full amount of the damages because all
or part of the special education services would be provided by the
municipality.77 The Connecticut Supreme Court held that such evidence
"would not be relevant because Connecticut follows the majority rule in this
country regarding collateral sources. 78
The application of the collateral source rule to state- provided special
education and therapy was next addressed in Northern Trust Co. v. County of
Cook.79 In Northern Trust, the defendant8° appealed the trial court's refusal to
admit evidence of the availability of free, state-provided services for
handicapped children.' Noting the uncertainty of the future availability of
state-provided services, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
Indeed, concerns of the jury speculating about future benefits "form a weak foundation for the law of
damages." See Jacobsen, supra note 12, at 536. One critic has even suggested that the exclusion of
collateral source benefits works to the detriment of plaintiffs who are not the beneficiaries of collateral
source payments because the jury assumes that most people have insurance and adjust the amount of
the award accordingly. See McDowell, supra note 23, at 215.
74. 378 A.2d 540 (Conn. 1977).
75. The defendants' truck collided with the plaintiffs' car. The plaintiffs' seven and one-half year
old son flew from the car. The boy sustained brain damage and suffered from epilepsy after the
accident. Id. at 542-43.
76. Id. at 546.
77. Id. At the time of the appeal, the boy "was receiving special education at no cost through a
public school program provided by the town of Newtown." Id.
78. Id. The court specifically held that "proof as to whether or not [the municipality] would
continue its special education program in its public school system was not relevant under the collateral
source rule." Id.
79. 481 N.E.2d 957, 960 (I11. App. Ct. 1985).
80. The defendant was a doctor who admitted liability for negligently failing to diagnose and
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to exclude as evidence the existence of free, state-provided special education
and therapy. 2
In Enson v. Wilson, the Supreme Court of Alabama also addressed the
application of the collateral source rule to state- provided special education
and therapy.83 The parents of a premature child who suffered a degree of
brain damage and retardation brought a medical malpractice action against
the delivering obstetrician.84 The court granted the plaintiffs' motion in limine
"to preclude any reference by defendants to the special education and therapy
available to [the child] from governmental sources."85 On appeal, the
defendants challenged the motion in limine contending that they were entitled
to introduce evidence that Alabama86 and federal laws87 conferred an absolute
right on the child to receive special education and related services, thus
reducing the child's future financial needs.8 In affinring the trial court's
exclusion of the evidence, the Alabama Supreme Court relied in part on
Healy and found "no reason" to distinguish special education and therapy
from other government services that courts had found were covered by the
collateral source rule. 9
The Alabama Supreme Court, in Williston v. Ard, recently reaffinned its
decision regarding the application of the collateral source rule to state-
82. Id. The court offered no other rationale for its decision, and it did not consider how the future
availability of state-provided services supported the exclusion of evidence or that prior to trial, the
plaintiff was receiving free, state- provided special education and therapy. By the time the case reached
the appellate court, the plaintiff had availed himself of several years of free, state-provided "physical,
occupational, speech and music therapy, adaptive physical education and special transportation." Id. at
959.
83. 519 So. 2d 1244 (Ala. 1978).
84. Id. at 1246-50.
85. Id. at 1266.
86. The defendants were referring to the Alabama Exceptional Child Education Act, ALA. CODE
§ 16-39-3 (1975). The statute provides:
Each school board shall provide not less than 12 consecutive years of appropriate instruction and
special services for exceptional children, beginning with those six years of age, in accordance with
the provisions of this chapter. Such public school instruction and special services shall be made
available at public expense for each school year .... No matriculation or tuition fees or other fees
or charges shall be required or asked of exceptional children or their parents or guardians, except
such fees or charges as may be charged uniformly of all public school pupils.
Id.
87. See supra note 6.
88. Ensor,519So.2dat 1266.
89. Id. at 1266-67. The court stated the general proposition that evidence of benefits conferred on
the plaintiff from collateral sources "is not relevant, its existence renders neither more probable nor
less probable any material fact in the case .... Id. at 1266 (quoting 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 206
(1988)).
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provided special education and therapy.9" In Williston, the defendant9 sought
to introduce testimony from the local special education coordinator about the
availability of programs in the county school for multihandicapped children
like the plaintiff.92 The trial court had excluded the evidence under the
collateral source rule. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court reaffirmed its
decision in Ensor and upheld the trial court's refusal of the special education
coordinator's testimony.93
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in Cates v. Wilson, adopted a
similar application of the collateral source rule to state-provided special
education and therapy.94 In Cates, the North Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed the reversal of a trial court's decision to allow testimony about the
existence of state-provided special education and therapy in a medical
malpractice action.95 During the trial, the defendant's expert testified that the
plaintiff's local public school "provided excellent training for mentally and
physically handicapped persons until age 22."96 The defendant's expert also
testified that under North Carolina law,97 special education was available to
all, regardless of their financial status, and that while there could be no
guarantee of continued availability, public funding for special education had
been "reliable.""
In finding that the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting the
expert's testimony, the North Carolina Supreme Court identified several
reasons for applying the collateral source rule to state-provided special
education and therapy. First, the court stated that if the collateral source rule
were not applied to special education, the "compensatory goal underlying our
tort system" would be thwarted because the plaintiff would be forced "to
90. 611 So. 2d 274 (Ala. 1992).
91. The defendant was a doctor sued for negligently causing a child to suffer severe brain
damage during the course of a "routine appendectomy." Id. at 276.
92. Id. at 278.
93. Id. The court stated: "an amount of damages is not decreased by the benefits received by a
plaintiff from a source wholly collateral to and independent of the wrongdoer, including services
provided by the state at government expense or decreased by institutionalization at government
expense." Id.
94. 361 S.E.2d 734 (N.C. 1987).
95. Id. at 737-39. Cates was a medical malpractice action brought on behalf of a child who
suffered brain damage and cerebral palsy during birth due to the defendant doctor's alleged
negligence. Id. at 736.
96. Id. at 737.
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depend on public coffers." The court then reasoned that the lack of certainty
to the future availability of public resources made mitigating damages
premised on the continued existence of public benefits unwise."o Finally, 10 1
the court concluded "as between defendants who tortiously inflict injury and
innocent taxpayers who fund [these special education programs] ... we think
it better that the loss fall on the tortfeasor."' 02
B. Minority Approach
Taking a strikingly different approach than the majority ofjurisdictions, in
Florida Physician 's Insurance Reciprocal v. Stanley the Supreme Court of
Florida held that the collateral source rule did not preclude the introduction of
evidence relating to the availability of state-provided special education. 3 In
so holding, the court reversed the appellate court which found error in the trial
court's decision to allow the defendant to cross-examine the plaintiff's expert
about the existence of state-provided special education and therapy. The
four person majority"0 4 of the Florida Supreme Court reasoned that the
-collateral source rule should be limited to those benefits earned in some way
99. Id. at 738. In making this assertion, the court felt the plaintiff should not be denied the
opportunity of utilizing pinvate care and cited Sedler for the proposition that
the plaintiffshould be able to recover the cost of future medical services, since he is likely to prefer
private care, and it is his "right" to have it. It may be that he will employ the free care for which he
is eligible.., but. . at the time ofsuit there is no way of knowing what he will choose to do.
Id. (quoting Sedler, supra note 12, at 186).
100 Cares, 361 S.E.2d at 738-39. The court was concerned that public benefits could not be
counted on to exist throughout the plaintiff's lifetime, especially in light of the increasing budget
constraints that both federal and state governments face. Id. Other judges have also found the
uncertainty of continued funding to be a significant factor behind their support of the application of the
collateral source rule to state-provided special education and therapy. See Florida Physician's Ins.
Reciprocal v. Stanley, 452 So. 2d 514, 516-17 (Fla. 1984).
101. The court noted that the collateral source rule should apply to future public benefits because
the utilization of these benefits hinges on the plaintiff's continued indigence. Cates, 361 S.E.2d at 739.
However, the court observed that under North Carolina law access to special education did not hinge
on financial status. Id Most likely, the court discussed this rationale in reference to the other public
services, such as Medicaid and Aid to Families with Dependent Children, whose availability does
depend on financial need.
102. Id.
103. Physician's, 452 So. 2d at 515. Like most of the cases considering the collateral source rule
in the context of state-provided special education and therapy, this action was brought on behalf of a
child who claimed that the doctor's negligence during delivery caused his mental retardation and
cerebral palsy. Id. at 514.
104. In Physician's three justices concurred with the majority's written opinion, while three
justices offered a vigorous dissent.
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by the plaintiff."'"5 Building on this reasoning, the court found that
"[g]overnmental or charitable benefits available to all citizens, regardless of
wealth or status, should be admissible for the jury to consider in determining
the reasonable cost of necessary future care."' 10 6
Three dissenting justices voiced concern about the "speculative value of
future public assistance."'0 7 The dissent further reasoned that "[b]y denying
the victim full compensation for the cost of future care, the majority opinion
transfers the responsibility for the tort from the tortfeasor, where it legally and
morally belongs, to the victim and the community."' '
Recently, the Missouri Supreme Court, in Washington v. Barnes Hospital,
unanimously followed the approach taken by the Florida Supreme Court.0 9 In
Barnes, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice suit against defendant
doctors and hospital for failure to diagnose her placental abruption which
caused permanent brain damage to the fetus. At trial, the court denied the
defendants' request to introduce evidence about the availability of free, public
special education and therapies."O On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court
examined the various rationales advanced in support of the collateral source
rule."' Finding these rationales inapplicable in the context of free, state-
provided special education and therapy, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the trial judge and held that the collateral source rule did not
105. Physician's, 452 So. 2d at 515.
106. Id. In taking this approach, the Florida court cited with approval Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt
Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1, 5 (I1l. 1979). In Peterson, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to apply the
collateral source rule to gratuitous medical services. Physician's, 452 So. 2d at 516. The dissent in
Physician's was quick to point out the factual dissimilarities between the case it was considering and
Peterson. Id. at 516-17 (Shaw, J., dissenting). In particular, the dissent focused on the fact that in
Peterson, the plaintiff voluntarily applied for and received free medical services at the Shriner's
Hospital prior to seeking compensation for the same services from the tortfeasor. The dissent in
Physician's interpreted Peterson to mean that "an individual is not entitled to recover for the value of
previously rendered free services he has voluntarily obtained." Id. at 516 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the majority apparently took no notice of the fact that the Illinois Court of Appeals
specifically rejected the application of Peterson's approach to state provided special education in
Northern Trust.
107. Id. at 517 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (Shaw, J., dissenting). The dissent was unwilling to allow taxpayer contributions to
"become a device for reducing the legal liability of a tortfeasor." Id. (Shaw, ., dissenting).
109. 897 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. 1995).
110. Id.at615.
111. The court considered and rejected the following: the benefit of the bargain rationale; the
punishment rationale; the windfall for the plaintiff rationale; th  argument that the rule is necessary to
protect the injured plaintiff from the uncertainty of continued funding and availability of public
benefits; and the argument that the collateral source rule is needed to compensate the plaintiff for the
costs incurred in the form of legal fees and expenses. Id. at 619.
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preclude introducing evidence of the availability of free, state-provided
education and therapy offered to mitigate the plaintiffs damages."' Rather,
the court held that the evidence was admissible"' and that, at retrial, the
plaintiffs would be entitled to "respond to this evidence with arguments of
[the state-provided services'] inadequacy, the risk of its continued
availability, etc.''114
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE
COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE TO FREE, STATE-PROVIDED SPECIAL
EDUCATION AND THERAPY
A rule of law is only valid to the extent that the application of the rule
furthers the substantive polices which the rule embodies."' The simple fact
that a common-law rule is firmly entrenched in our system cannot justify the
application of that rule in situations where it loses touch with its traditional
justifications. The application of the collateral source rule to prevent the
admission of evidence of free, state-provided special education and therapy is
a clear example of a situation in which a rule of law has been applied without
regard to its origins and policies.
The benefit of the bargain rationale traditionally advanced in support of
the collateral source rule"6 does not sustain the application of the rule to state-
provided special education and therapy. Individuals do not contract with the
state to provide special education and therapy in the event that such services
become necessary. At most, a potential plaintiff may have contributed to the
state special education system by paying taxes. 7 This form of indirect
payment does not establish the same type of indemnity policy as the payment
112. Id.at621.
113. The court also indicated in dicta that an additional justification for allowing this mitigation
evidence was the fact that the plaintiff "opened the door to this issue by injecting testimony of [the
plaintiff's] financial condition into the case." Id. This is consistent with the approach taken by other
courts, see supra note 17.
114. Barnes, 897 S.W.2d. at621.
115. A "fundamental" tenant of jurisprudence is that a principle of law cannot be applied once
courts have strayed from the foundation upon which the principle is based. See Victor E. Schwartz,
Tort Law Reform: Strict Liability and the Collateral Source Rule Do Not Mix, 39 VAND. L. REv. 569,
573 (1986) (arguing that if the defendant is found liable under strict liability, the courts are no longer
applying the collateral source rule as originally intended or justified).
116. For a discussion of this rationale, see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
117. A taxpayer's contribution to the state special education system may take a variety of different
forms, but a common method of funding special education and therapy is through a property tax. See,
e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 162.920 (Vernon 1995).
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of medical or life insurance premiums."' Indeed, any payment of taxes in
support of the state special education system does not raise the same concerns
about protecting a plaintiff who has had the independent foresight to obtain
some form of indemnity insurance in the event of tragedy. Thus, the failure to
extend the collateral source rule to state-provided special education and
therapy does not undermine the socially beneficial goal of individually
maintained private insurance policies." 9
Similarly, the deterrence/windfall justification' for the collateral source
rule offers no support for the application to state-provided special education
and therapy. While the deterrent/windfall argument may have originally
offered sound footing for the collateral source rule,' the tort system has
undergone profound changes since the rule's inception.2 2 The increase of
liability insurance has decreased the importance of the deterrent goal of the
tort system and given rise to a system that focuses on loss allocation.' When
viewed from this perspective, the application of the collateral source rule to
state-provided special education and therapy places an extremely heavy
burden on society. Under the modem tort system, a strong argument can be
made that the collateral source rule's exclusion of evidence relating to the
availability of free, state-provided special education and therapy results in
higher costs to consumers. 4 Furthermore, the application of the collateral
source rule to state-provided special education and therapy may cause
members of society to suffer yet an additional blow: even though the rule
may allow an injured plaintiff to recover the full cost of his special education
and therapy needs, members of society still may be forced to bear the cost of
providing the injured plaintiff with special education and therapy if the
118. See supra notes 50, 105 and accompanying text.
119. For a discussion of this rationale, see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
120. For a discussion of this argument in favor of the collateral source rule, see supra notes 59-61
and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
122. For a discussion of the changes in the tort system, see supra notes 62-63 and accompanying
text.
123. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the way tortfeasors and
insurance companies shift the burden for damage awards to consumers in the form of increased prices
and premiums. Under this system of loss redistribution, the application of the collateral source rule to
state-provided special education and therapy increases the amount of loss that a tortfeasor must
redistribute. The application of the collateral source rule to state-provided special education increases
the amount of damages for special education and therapy recoverable by an injured plaintiff. This
increased amount of damages for education and therapy increases the total amount of damages, which
in turn increases the total amount of damages that must be redistributed.
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plaintiff chooses to utilize the state-provided special education system. In this
regard, the application of the collateral source rule to free, state-provided
special education and therapy injects a societal cost into personal injury
awards that far outweighs any possible deterrent effect the rule may have in
the modem tort system.1
25
Contending that juries will be confused by the introduction of state-
provided special education and therapy evidence does not support arguments
against the application of the rule. 2 6 Juries are already entrusted with the
responsibility of considering extremely difficult and foreign evidence to reach
their verdicts in a variety of complex cases. The introduction of state-
provided special education and therapy evidence would certainly not be any
more confusing. Indeed, it could be argued that nothing could be more
confusing than the approach under the traditional application of the collateral
source rule because jurors know from their own life experience that the state
provides free special education services-often services of considerable
quantity and quality-to handicapped children and yet are not instructed how
to deal with that knowledge in reaching the amount of their verdict.
Moreover, the contention that under our tort system a plaintiff never fully
recovers for his injuries'28 also falls short of offering a sound justification for
applying the collateral source rule to state-provided special education and
therapy. Certainly no amount of money can truly compensate a person for the
loss of their mental or physical abilities, but that is just one of many harsh
facts inherent in our tort system. It is a reflection of the limitations of a system
in which the best that can be done is make a rough estimate of the plaintiffs
injury and reduce that estimation to a money judgment.29 Indeed, if no
amount of money will ever compensate an injured plaintiff for the loss of
mental or physical capacity, it is certainly difficult to quantify the degree to
which the additional dollars provided by applying the collateral source rule
assist in compensating an injured plaintiff. Thus, while perhaps offering the
most emotionally appealing argument in favor of applying the collateral
source rule to state-provided special education and therapy, the notion that an
125. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text for an examination of the modem tort system's
decreased deterrent ability.
126. For a discussion of this argument in favor of the collateral source rule, see supra notes 67-69
and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
128. For a discussion of this rationale, see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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injured plaintiff is never fully compensated for his injuries fails to offer a
principled basis for the rule's application.'
VII. PROPOSAL
None of the arguments commonly offered to justify the application of the
collateral source rule supports the traditional application of the rule to free,
state-provided special education and therapy.' While these arguments fail to
support the traditional application of the collateral source rule,' the
substantive component of the rule continues to have merit. The substantive
component reflects a principle which should be maintained when considering
the award of damages to a plaintiff requiring special education and therapy
(i.e., a defendant should never be allowed to summarily deduct from the
plaintiff's damages the amount that the plaintiff receives in compensation for
her injuries from outside sources). 3 In light of the importance of this
principle, an approach which precludes the summary reduction of the
plaintiffs damages based on the availability of free, state-provided special
education and therapy yet allows for the introduction of evidence relating to
both the existence and quality of the state-provided services, not only meets
the needs of an injured plaintiff, but also addresses the concerns of a society
and a judicial system attempting to reach a just award of damages for a
plaintiff in need of special education and therapy.
In terms of educational expenditures, a severely injured plaintiff requires
an award of damages which allows her to obtain the special education and
therapy that she requires. An approach to state-provided special education and
therapy which prevents the summary reduction from the plaintiffs damages
to account for the availability of free, state-provided special education and
therapy, yet allows for the introduction of evidence relating to the existence
and quality of the state-provided services, ensures that this need is fulfilled.
The prohibition against the summary reduction of the plaintiffs damage
award prevents forcing the plaintiff to use the state-provided services if those
services will not satisfy her needs.' 34 In a similar fashion, under this approach,
130. See supra note 54.
131. See supra Part VI for an analysis of the application of the collateral source rule to state-
provided special education and therapy in light of the traditional justifications for the rule.
132. For an explanation of substantive and evidentiary components of the collateral source rule,
see supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
134. In the absence of the rule's substantive component, the plaintiff's award of damages would
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the plaintiff will provide the jury with a range of evidence relating to the
state-provided services, including any evidence that these services will not
fulfill her needs.' All of the information that the plaintiff provides to the jury
will assist the plaintiff to obtain an award which accurately assesses her
special education needs.
In the context of a plaintiff in need of special education and therapy,
society is primarily concerned with providing her with appropriate services at
an appropriate overall cost. An approach which prevents a summary
deduction from the plaintiff's damage award, yet allows for the full and
complete introduction of evidence relating to state-provided services, fosters
this goal. First, the prohibition against summary reduction prevents a plaintiff
from being denied access to appropriate services.' 36 Second, if the jury
concludes that the state-provided services meet the plaintiff's needs, then the
plaintiff's damage award could be adjusted accordingly. Under modem
theories of loss shifting,'37 reducing the plaintiff's award would prevent
society from paying twice for the special education services it provides: once
in the form of taxes' and again in the form of higher consumer prices.'39
Thus, society is able to fiffil efficiently the plaintiff's special education
be reduced by the amount of the collateral source benefit. In the context of state-provided special
education and therapy, the absence of the rule's substantive component would allow for the reduction
of the plaintiff's damage award to reflect the value of the free, state-provided services. Such a
reduction would effectively preclude the plaintiff from choosing to receive special education and
therapy from a private provider because her damage award would not provide funds for private
services. The failure to adhere to the substantive component of the rule would be extremely harsh to a
plaintiff whose special education and therapy needs could not be adequately met by the state-provided
services.
135. In this context, the plaintiff may seek to introduce a wide variety of information. Perhaps
most importantly, the plaintiff would introduce any evidence that would tend to show that the state-
provided services would fail to meet her special education needs. For example, the plaintiff may
introduce evidence that she requires a particular service which can be more readily obtained at a
private institution. The plaintiff would also introduce any evidence to support the notion that the
continued existence of free, state-provided services was uncertain. The plaintiff also would offer
evidence relating to the proximity of state-provided services compared to private services and any
other evidence indicating that private services would better meet her special education and therapy
needs.
136. See supra note 134 for an explanation of how the absence of the substantive component of
the collateral source rule could force the plaintiff to utilize state-provided services.
137. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 117 and accompanying text for an explanation of how various taxes are used
to fund state-provided special education and therapy.
139. See supra note 64 and accompanying text for an explanation of the way consumers pay for
increased jury awards in the form of higher prices and increased insurance premiums. For a discussion
of how members of society can actually pay twice for the cost of providing an injured plaintiff with
special education and therapy, see supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
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needs while avoiding duplicate costs.
Similarly, the judicial system's goal of accurately assessing the injured
plaintiffs special education needs to establish just and fair compensation is
satisfied by an approach that bars summary reduction of the plaintiff's
damages and encourages introducing a range of state-provided services
evidence. An approach which prevents the summary reduction of a plaintiff s
damage award to account for the existence of free, state-provided special
education and therapy promotes a judicial system which avoids arbitrary
results. Indeed, under this approach, instead of automatically deducting the
value of the state-provided services from the plaintiffs damage award, the
court considers a range of evidence relating to the state-provided services and
is able to make an informed decision. The ability to make an informed
decision in light of all relevant evidence, including evidence of free, state-
provided services, enables the court to make an accurate assessment of the
plaintiffs true special education needs. The ability to make an accurate
assessment of the plaintiffs needs avoids overcompensation and assists the
court in establishing a just and fair result.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In its traditional form, the collateral source rule should not be applied to
free, state-provided special education and therapy. However, an approach
which preserves the substantive component of the rule-preventing the
summary reduction of the plaintiffs damage award, but also promoting the
full introduction of evidence relating to the state-provided services-answers
the problems inherent in awarding damages to a plaintiff in need of special
education and therapy. This approach protects the plaintiff from arbitrary
results while addressing the concems of society and fostering the goals of the
judicial system. Therefore, in keeping with this approach, courts and
legislatures should follow the lead of the Florida and Missouri courts
recognizing that the traditional application of the collateral source rule cannot
be applied soundly to state-provided special education and therapy. 4 ' By
preventing summary reduction and promoting full introduction of evidence,
courts and legislatures will find a workable solution to awarding damages in
cases which involve a plaintiff in need of special education and therapy.
Richard C. Witzel Jr.
140. See supra notes 103-14 and accompanying text.
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